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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant appeals from. the lower Court's determination
that Respondent has a partnership interest in the Squaw Peak Inc.
complex together with rights reflected in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

DISPOSITION OF CASE
The Trial Court awarded the Plaintiff a twenty-five
(25) percent interest in a

limit~d

partnership involving all

of the assets of Squaw Peqk Inc. together with other rights as
set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the lower Court's decision
affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent will not re-state all of the facts pertinent
to this case on appeal but will add facts omitted by Appellant
and correct any mis-stated facts.
The Complaint in this case was filed August 10, 1979,
and the trial was held November 15, 1979.

Prior to the day of
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trial Plaintiff had filed a motion for a continuance because
the Defendant had failed to answer interrogatories or produce
documents (See line 4 page 2 of the Transcript of Trial).

The

Court denied Plaintiff's motion and the matter was heard that
day by the Court.

The Plaintiff's motion for continuance, to

compel answers to interrogatories and to produce documents are
not contained in this record.
It is significant to note that Thomas C. Stubbs did
not appear as a witness at the trial, even though he was the
only Defendant with first-hand knowledge of the transaction
involving the Plaintiff-Respondent.

The trial judge had before

him three documents (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1,2, and 3) together
with other exhibits and the testimony of the Plaintiff.

The

testimony of the Plaintiff was uncontradicted and the defense
relied entirely upon the defense of merger and failure of consideration to defeat the Plaintiff-Respondent's claim.
The statement by Appellant that the Plaintiff received

$170,000.00 is an incorrect statement of fact (Transcript of
Trial, page 13 line 26).

The Respondent received $37,616.70 of

the original $40,000.00 which was part of the $105,000.00 payable
as per the Earnest Money Agreement.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 1)

2
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Plaintiff testified that the selling price was $170,000.00,
payable $40,000.00 cash, the assumption of the existing $65,000.00
mortgage and $65,000.00 payable as per Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
Plaintiff was to receive a one-fourth (1/4) interest in the
Squaw Peak complex when developed and would retain the use of the
home located on the property.

The balance of the terms and

conditions contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 were to constitute
the agreement between the parties.

Stubbs and Horton were to

pay off the $65,000.00 balance which was owing to Wasatch Bank
of Pleasant Grove.

With this understanding the Respondent

Appellant executed a Warranty Deed to Squaw Peak Inc., a nonexistent corporation.
The earnest money agreement was dated September 5,
1978 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 1), the amendment thereto was dated
September 22, 1978 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2) and the Warranty
Deed from Plaintiff to Squaw Peak Inc. was dated November 1,
1978.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

It was the Plaintiff's conten-

tion that Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 constituted the agreement
of the parties, artd a partnership was to be established.

(See

item 1 of Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 "limited partnership is taking
title").

However, Defendant Stubbs breached the agreement by
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having the property deeded to Squaw Peak Inc., a non-existent
corporation. (date of incorporation March 16, 1979, - See line
16, page 58 of the transcript of the trial).

There is absolutely

no evidence in the record of any consideration passing from
Squaw Peak Inc. to Respondent - Judy Baxter.

POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS 1,2 AND 4 WERE NOT MERGED INTO THE
WARRANTY DEED.
Counsel for Appellant cites the Stubbs v. Hemmert case
to support his merger theory.

However, he recites only that

portion of the language in the case that supports his position.
At page 169 of the Stubbs v. Hemmert case the following language
by our Supreme Court appears determinative of the question of

merger in this case:
"However, if the original contract calls for
performance by the seller of some act collateral
to conveyance of title, his obligations with respect
thereto survive the deed and are not extinguished
by it." 38 A.L.R. 2d 1131, Sec. 2.
Further, the Court stated:
"Whether the terms of the contract are collateral,
or are part of the obligation to convey and therefQre unenforceable after delivery of the deed,
depends to a great extent on the interest of the
parties with respect thereto."
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In the case before the Court, the Respondent executed
a Warranty Deed to Squaw Peak Inc., with the understanding that
the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement and the addendum thereto,
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2, would be fully complied with by
Appellant-Stubbs.

It is clear from Plaintiff-Respondent's

testimony that she was to receive a one-fourth (1/4) interest in
a partnership to be formed, together with the use of a red brick
home located on the property.

There were other terms and con-

ditions as set forth in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.

The seller in

this case met her obligation to convey by Warranty Deed, but the
buyer seeks to defeat her claim by asserting the defense of
"merger".

Obviously, the terms and conditions found in Plain-

tiff's Exhibit 2 were separate and apart from the conveyance
by deed and constituted the actual consideration for the conveyance.
The language found in 17 Am Jur 2d 483, p 953 supports
Respondent's position: (my emphasis by underlining)
"Also, as a minimum prerequisite to any correct
holding that one contract has been merged in
another by reason of the fact that several
documents relating to the same subject were
executed on the same date, there must be some
reasonable basis for finding that the parties so
intented."
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The Appellant cites the Flinco Inc., v. Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Company, case 17 Utah 2d 173, 406 P 2d 911
(19) for the proposition that the Plaintiff must show that a
deed is not clear and ambiguous on its face, in order to overcome the doctrine of merger.

Again, that case and the Rasmussen

v. Olsen case, 583 P. 2d 5 (Utah 1978) apply only to situations
where the deed in its execution and delivery constituted the
final agreement between the parties.
buyer

ha~

Clearly in this case, the

agreed to terms and conditions which were separate

and apart from the transfer by deed and actually constituted
consideration by the buyer for the conveyance.
In responding to Points II, III and IV in Appellant's
brief, the merger argument in Point II is answered by Respondent's
argument to Point I.

At page 7 of Appellant's brief the follow-

ing underlined language clearly supports Appellant's argument:
"The delivery and acceptance of a deed, executed
pursuant to the provisions of a precedent contract
for the sale of real property, ~ay merge rights
conferred by the contract into it. Stipulations
in the orior contract, of which conveyance is not
a performance, are superseded bfi the deed if the
parties intended to surrender t em."
Obviously, the Appellant wants a merger in this case
since that would defeat the Plaintiff-Respondent's 25% interest
in the Squaw Peak project, and the rights awarded to her by the

-6
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Court pursuant to the addendum agreement, Plaintiff's Exhibit 2.
However, is there any evidence to support the Appellant's claim
that the Plaintiff-Respondent intended to surrender her rights
under the addendum agreement by executing the Warranty Deed?
Apparently the District Court could find no evidence to support
that proposition and ruled in favor of the Respondent.
The arguments made by Appellant in Point III and IV
concerning consideration are without any merit whatsoever.

The

Plaintiff-Respondent executed a Warranty Deed, dated November,
1978,

transfe~ring

real property to Squaw Peak Inc.

In return,

she received $37,616. 70 cash, had a mortgage balance of $65,000.00
paid by an SBA loan, and was to receive the benefits referred
to in Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, executed September 22, 1978.
According to the record in this case the only failure of consideration was on the part of Squaw Peak Inc., a non-entity on
November 1, 1978.

CONCLUSION
The District Court judgment should be upheld in all
particulars and the Respondent should be awarded costs of this
appeal.
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Respectfully submitted,

MATT BILJANIC
Attorney for espondent
Certificate Of Mailing
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to Thomas W. Seiler, Attorney for Appellant, 1325 South
800 East, Suite 310, Orem, Utah 84057, postage prepaid, this /d
day of

m~r.L
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